Blood on the Tracks, because you don't have a genuine end-product. It will be like looking at an artist's sketches and preliminary studies instead of the finished painting. Many of the album's aesthetic attributes will be different (most notably for "Idiot Wind").

Because rock is almost exclusively a tradition of popular song, and popular songs are allographic and ontologically very thin, there is a tendency to downplay the ontological "thickness" of recordings as the unit of critical attention. Many efforts to dismiss rock music as derivative, primitive, and musically simple will strike us as misguided attempts to grasp rock exclusively as an allographic art form. Those who disdain rock typically respond only to the songs and performances, ignoring relevant properties and values like instrumental mix, stereo placement of various elements, echo on the voice, and even how ragged or nasal the singer's voice was at the time of the recording. But since recordings can be fakes, forgeries, or otherwise inauthentic presentations while providing authentic performances of specific songs, they are autographic musical works. And such works are the standard end-products and signifiers in rock music, and have been as far back as Elvis Presley's Sun sessions.

From Gracyk, Theodore. Rhythm and Noise: An Aesthetics of Rock. Durham: Duke UP, 1996

2

I'll Be Your Mirror: Recording and Representing

The Machine Age can affect music only in its distribution. Composers must compose in the same way the old composers did. No one has found a new method in which to write music. We still use the old signatures, the old symbols. . . . Handiwork can never be replaced in the composition of music. If music ever became machine-made in that sense, it would cease to be an art. —George Gershwin on the phonograph[1]

Recordings and Performances

The photographic image is produced instantaneously by the reflection of light; its figuration is *not* impregnated by experience or consciousness. —John Berger[2]

"Rock 'n' roll differed from previous forms of music in that records were its initial medium," declares Reebee Garofalo, because "technology exists as an element of the music itself."[3] But Carl Belz may have been the first to note that "rock has existed primarily on records." Live performance notwithstanding,

> Although jazz and other types of folk music exist on records, they did not originate in that medium. For the most part, they originated and developed through live performances. Rock, it seems to me, has generally done the opposite. *Records were the music's initial medium.*[4]

Another critic soon noted,

> with the advent of rock (and I think it's still very much a characteristic of rock), what was important was not the song. What is remembered in rock is a particular entity of music and technology,

all put together in a very specific way and infinitely repeatable on the record, and *only* on the record.[5]

Although it is absurd to say that the song is not important, all three agree that recordings have a special status in rock. But what can it mean to call it rock's medium?

The symbiotic relationship between rock and recording technology hastened the process by which music meets its audience as a commodity. As a new way of connecting music and audience, its history cannot be separated from the decline of Tin Pan Alley, the rapid expansion of the record industry, and the transformation of radio.[6] As such, rock and roll was not just a new sound. But these trends do not show that recording is being used as an "instrument" or a medium. For that, we must address further issues: does this link support a distinct creative and interpretative activity? If so, recording is not just the commodification of popular music. Does it influence the musical thinking of both the audience and the musicians? If not, it is a mere confusion to suppose that "records were [rock] music's initial medium" or that rock recordings are autographic works.

One complication is that in musical traditions predating rock, recordings are basically byproducts of performances. For many musics, performance remains the basic medium. In Simon Frith's blunt words, "Recording was, in its early days, simply that: the direct recording onto a cylinder or disc. What record buyers heard was the sound of the original performance."[7] Thus early Edison recordings said "Edison Re-Creation" on their labels, and their paper sleeves promised "Comparison with the living artist reveals no difference." Victor Red Seals were advertised as "a mirror" of the human voice.

For musical traditions in which works routinely circulate by means other than recording, performance retains ontological priority over recordings. (One can have performances without recordings, but not vice versa.) Robert Johnson's music was unknown beyond the juke joints of Mississippi and Tennessee before "Terraplane Blues" became a minor hit. Recording for Vocalion in 1936 and 1937, Johnson performed in a hotel room. Had we been in that room, we would have heard the music of which we now have but an aural snapshot. Here, recording technology functions as a transmitting material. Musicologist Jacques Chailley notes that preservation is still the main function in recording the music of oral traditions: "those [traditional] musics which we hear from the record player . . . are only photographs in sound."[8] In short, for some musics recording still mechanically reproduces musical performances. Recording is a pseudo-performance, not the primary medium.

The claim that recording is rock's primary medium implies that recordings of the Beatles or Nine Inch Nails have a fundamentally different status than those of Robert Johnson, a Beethoven symphony, and an Aboriginal song. I argue that this special status extends to rock recordings that derive directly from a single performance. The four Replacements may have been together in the studio performing "Tommy Gets His Tonsils Out," so the track on *Let It Be* (1984) is an aural snapshot of a specific performance. However, the liner notes to *Let It Be* make it clear that many of the tracks are overdubbed; Paul Westerberg evidently plays all the instruments on "Answering Machine" and later on "Here Comes a Regular" (1985). Whether or not the group performed any of it whole, my analysis circles back to the fact that they belong to a tradition that typically does otherwise, using recordings to submit new musical works to the public. Rock musicians as diverse as Prince, Roy Wood, Todd Rundgren, John Fogerty, and Bruce Springsteen have made records on which they alone appear, employing overdubbing to sound like a group. Robert Johnson belonged to a tradition of a very different sort.

But not everyone grants that recordings can be anything more than byproducts of performances. Needing a label for the position that performances *always* have ontological priority, let us call it recording realism. It is related to an established position concerning photography and cinema: the parent theme is that any mechanical recording is essentially the documentation of some independent reality.[9] Although not himself a realist, William Moylan summarizes its basic aesthetic: "The recording medium is often called upon to be *transparent.* In these contexts, it is the function of the recording to capture the sound as accurately as possible, to capture the live performance without distortion."[10] Ideally, recording is invisible and the audience should *ignore* contributions of the recording process.

Realism populates the writings of André Bazin, Roland Barthes, Susan Sontag, Allan Casebier, Roger Scruton, Stanley Cavell, and many others. Some concentrate on photography, some on cinema. According to Sontag, photography is radically different from other "image-systems." Largely paraphrasing Bazin's contrast of painting and photography, she stresses that photography "is *not* dependent on an image maker":

> However carefully the photographer intervenes in setting up and guiding the image-making process, the process itself remains an optical-chemical (or electronic) one, the workings of which are automatic . . . The mechanical genesis of these images, and the literalness of the powers they confer, amounts to a new relationship between image and reality.[11]

In denying that language is present, John Berger similarly denies that photography and film are representational media. By extension, sound recording is not one, either. So it is not really an artistic medium.

There is a temptation to brush this off with a parody: because a piano is a machine which "mechanically" generates tones depending on the careful "setting up" (via keys) of the pianist, playing piano cannot be a genuine artistic performance. But this parody misses the core idea here, an idea deserving serious discussion. It is that when an independent reality is recorded with a machine, the information is stored and reproduced without notational encoding or symbolic transformation by a human. In Bazin's terms, the artist's personality is suppressed in favor of the machine's "essential objectivity." It seems that John Fogerty's *Centerfield* (1985), a truly "solo" recording, is not impregnated by Fogerty's thoughts about the music except as those were present in the act of performing.

Roger Scruton offers a precise formulation of the central realist assumption of Sontag, Bazin, Hernadi, Wolterstorff, Ingarden, and the rest. With visual art, he notes, "properties of the medium influence not only what is seen . . . but also the way it is seen."[12] Film, however, resists introduction of the artist's *thoughts* about its subject matter. Its recording technology can only "reproduce" the look or sound of things and so cannot be regarded as representational (Sontag's "image-system"). Scruton takes recorded music to be such a clear case of this that it grounds his realism about film, and not vice versa. "A cinematic record of an occurrence is not a representation of it," he insists, "any more than a recording of a concert is a representation of its sound."[13] However reconfigured, no process of human interpretation or semiotic transformation takes place.

To a stubborn realist, overdubbing and multitrack recording are basically gimmicks or shortcuts. Jazz purists seem particularly disposed to regard splices and overdubs as a cheat. While realism is most persuasive for undoctored recordings of specific performances, it easily stretches to fit doctored and spliced recordings. Pieced together to approximate one ideal performance (as Glenn Gould spliced together multiple takes

of Bach's *Goldberg Variations* to constitute one seamless performance), each fragment nonetheless takes its identity from its generating performance. Such techniques do not alter the essentially "reproductive" nature of recording: recording as a one-man band, John Fogerty or Prince must play the different instruments and sing the vocal parts. Extrapolating from film theory, recording realism says that editing and overdubbing techniques introduce no special "human intention" between the music and its appearance in the reproduction.[14]

Even those who participate in cut-and-paste recording are apt to adopt a realist interpretation of their activity. As he was working on *Tommy,* Pete Townshend expressed concern over the audience's failure to understand that rock records seldom reproduce specific performances:

> A lot of people, I'm convinced, that buy records don't realize what happens when a group records on an eight-track machine. They don't realize that they record half of it one time, and then another eighth of it another time. They record it in eighths at different locations and this ceases to become music to me.[15]

Complaining that a recording presents music "secondhand," Townshend endorses realism. Of course, this did not stop him from using the very practices that made it cease to be music to him; after the failure of the 1971 Young Vic Theatre sessions, the Who returned to playing against prerecorded synthesized backgrounds. Soon, *Quadrophenia* was constructed layer by layer.

The elaborate nature of some rock recordings makes their composite nature obvious to alert listeners, such as the chicken squawk that turns into a guitar note on the Beatles' *Sgt. Pepper* (1967). But the construction of recorded "performances" can be impossible to detect by listening. For instance, consider Townshend's realist interpretation of the power of the Sex Pistols on "Anarchy in the U.K." and "Bodies." Townshend remarks that "what immediately strikes you is that *this is actually happening.* This is a bloke . . . who is actually saying something he sincerely believes . . ."[16] But Townshend is simply wrong about the first claim. Whether Johnny Rotten was sincere or not is an open question. He certainly *sounds* as if he means it. But we know for a fact that these records are not recordings of a performance that "actually happened." The recordings were produced by Chris Thomas, fresh from his work with Roxy Music and Pink Floyd. The guitar and drums were recorded first, then more guitar was overdubbed in spots and bass guitar was added. The vocals were overdubbed later. In one take? Sev-

eral? Listening to the recordings does not reveal what "actually happened" any more than watching Sergei Eisenstein's *The Battleship Potemkin* (1925) shows what actually happened in Odessa in 1905. In the case of the Sex Pistols, there isn't even any prior event to dramatize and re-create, unless it is the emotions which the recordings *convey* (even if they do not actually *record* them).

Before laying out my extended argument against realism, I must offer two disclaimers.

First, recording's status as a distinct medium is not unique to rock. "Serious" composers have exploited recording equipment for composition and "performance." Yet this mode of musical activity is typically treated as marginal, experimental, or a special case. *Musique concrète,* in which all sorts of previously recorded sounds are assembled into original compositions, was generally more appealing in theory than in practice until DJs in the Bronx reinvented it in the 1970s, improvising break segments from fragments of recorded music. Relocated to the studio with the commercialization of rap, a technique of high culture entered the vernacular of mass culture.

Even theorists who allow that recordings can be autographic works find it hard to shake realism. While Paul Hernadi allows that cinema and television generate works in their own right, "a phonograph record or a videotape is a *technological* device for *storing* a *single* performance, edition, or animation."[17] Whenever recorded music is based on live performance—from a performance by musicians on instruments—he classifies playbacks as "secondary" instances of the musical work. The performances providing the recorded sounds are, of course, the primary instances. Thus, when Chic's "Good Times" (1979) turns up in "Grandmaster Flash and the Wheels of Steel" (1981), Hernadi must regard both records as secondary instances of a common performance. The originating guitar and bass performances of Niles Rodgers and Bernard Edwards would be primary instances, interpreting a musical work they'd composed. Because studio musicians were used to re-create "Good Times" as the backing for "Rapper's Delight" by the Sugarhill Gang (1979), it offers a distinct secondary instance. But *none* of these recordings are to be counted as autographic works. In the thrall of traditional assumptions, Hernadi contends that only recordings generated by computers without involving actual performance can be privileged autographic prototypes.[18]

Second, Lydia Goehr observes that while music's "mechanical reproduction" has the potential to challenge the traditional model of musical works and performances, the challenge has been largely unsuccessful.[19]

And I am not suggesting that rock *repudiates* prevailing concepts of the musical work. Rock's use of recording as a medium does not require a wholesale rethinking of music. Why assume that rock is entirely untouched by our prevailing ideologies of artistic production? Instead, rock adapts existing norms so that when recording is the medium, recordings simultaneously exemplify two different sorts of musical works: the autographic recording and the allographic song. Rock does not fully reject the model of composers and their "works" that stabilized in European high culture about two centuries ago. It thus feeds the assumption that—other than the special case of compositions for tape—its recordings are a reproduction and mere commodification of a performance. In short, rock retains some allegiance to established dichotomies of song/performance and composer/performer. As conventions of European high culture often taken as normative for all musical activity, their ideological biases have only recently been dragged into the glare of critical challenges.[20]

Defending the basic work/performance dichotomy, Roman Ingarden opines that a satisfying recording is basically a matter of good luck. After all, composers aren't always the music's best interpreters. When a recording features a composer definitively performing his or her own work, the composer's input alters the theoretical situation only to the extent that we now know that "the composer was *lucky enough, on a particular occasion,* to succeed in performing his own work." Ingarden thus dismisses any special status for "authorial rendering" by way of recorded music.[21] In other words, Chris Thomas was lucky to get good performances from the Sex Pistols, the music's composers. It seems that Brian Wilson's presence at the sessions for "Good Vibrations" (1966) was important only because he could not communicate through a written score; had he known notation, the performing and recording could have been left to someone else.

In sum, realism contends that performance has ontological priority over recordings. But I suggest that "Good Vibrations" and "No Future" are prime counterexamples. Although *based* on earlier performances, these recordings are "privileged" autographic works, primary instances, the basic texts. To shake off realism, let us turn to rock recordings that present songs whose identities are original to the recordings: the identity of the musical work is not determined by reference to the recording's underlying performances. As such, the recordings *represent* performances (in a precise sense outlined below) rather than *transmit* them. Transparency does not make sense of them.

Recording and Representing

The Photograph does not call up the past . . . what I see is not a memory, an imagination, a reconstitution, a piece of Maya, such as art lavishes upon us, but reality in a past state: at once the past and the real. — Roland Barthes[22]

The crux of the distinction between representation and mere recording (reproduction) is alleged to lie in differences in the relationship between the work and its subject.[23] When recordings are understood as essentially mechanical reproductions of the look or sound of something else, two points become central.

First, the recording relationship requires that two independent physical things or events must stand in an appropriate *causal* relationship to one another. With music, one of them is a musical performance. It is only by mimicking the sound of performances that recordings feature songs and other musical works. But a fictitious subject can't cause anything and so cannot be the subject of a mechanical recording. Since dinosaurs have long been extinct, there simply cannot be a photographic record of a dinosaur attacking a human, for that state of affairs has never and will never occur. Hence the films *Jurassic Park* (1993) and *The Flintstones* (1994) do not *record* the interaction of the dinosaurs and humans.

A representational relationship is needed to present situations that are not actual or to refer to a fictitious subject. As Scruton observes, representation is a matter of describing or depicting a fictional world — the interaction of humans and dinosaurs, for instance. So representation is *intentional:* mere resemblance won't do the job. This is not to say that the artist's intentions are sufficient to establish it. Those intentions must be supplemented by a system of representation by which they become accessible to others: there must be a representational medium. But a snapshot of Aunt Matilda records Aunt Matilda apart from any such system, provided she caused the image on the photo.[24]

As Arthur Danto is keen to point out, artistic media provide transfigurations of commonplace reality. Even if its subject and materials are "real things" appropriated from "real life," new properties are always added. In a truly invisible medium, never allowing properties over and above those present in the represented subject, the results would not be independent works or texts. It would be reduced to its content. Understanding artistic activity involves understanding the interpretative contribution of the medium to our grasp of the content.[25] In Roland Barthes' formulation, there is no writing or music that directly reflects

reality. From the perspective of the audience, it is opaque: "clarity is a purely rhetorical attribute."[26]

So what does this have to do with rock, particularly for its audience? Consider Aaron Copland's point that "the choice of the sound medium itself will almost certainly influence the nature of the composer's thought." Thus, the "principal concern of the composer is to seek out the expressive nature of any particular instrument and to write with that in mind."[27] While Copland may be accused of overemphasizing expression at the expense of other values, he reminds us that in listening to music we are confronting human thought, not just sound. If recording is rock's medium and the audience does *not* take account of the medium, they can only respond at an unsophisticated level, confined to its most basic features and obvious meanings. The work is reduced to its descriptive, narrative, or expressive elements.[28] More complex meanings arise only as one relates it to a larger class of associated works and to the range of choices available in the medium. Without denigrating the response of less sophisticated members of the audience, if they treat recordings as transparent transmissions of performances that happen to be recorded, there is that much less room for encoding and disseminating meanings.

The second important point is that a recording informs us about its source performance by replicating visual or auditory features of it. Since a mechanical recording is not *designed* to remind one of its subject, it cannot express a thought about it. While it is always "of" one subject rather than another, it cannot take a position "about" that subject. A mechanical reproduction is a mute witness of history. A photograph of George Bush vomiting at a Japanese banquet may make him look pathetic or ridiculous, but it cannot express the photographer's idea that Bush is pathetic or ridiculous. At best, we can be encouraged to draw false inferences about the source; in a film, perspective makes it look as if Harold Lloyd is dangling from a clock at the top of a tall building, when he is merely on the second floor of a building on top of a steep hill.

How, then, can photographs and films have fictional subjects? Must a realist concede that *Jurassic Park* represents dinosaurs attacking humans? Not at all.

Consider an actual case, Julia Margaret Cameron's "King Arthur" (1874) — one of her photographs portraying scenes and characters from Tennyson.[29] Realism simply denies that King Arthur is the subject of Cameron's photo. The subject must be whatever caused the photo-

graph, so the subject must be someone portraying King Arthur. The person's act of portraying Arthur, not Margaret Cameron's act of taking the photo, does the representing. Echoing Ingarden's remarks about "luck" in recording music, Scruton contends that Ingmar Bergman's *Wild Strawberries* (1957) is only a cinematic masterpiece because it documents something that is independently a dramatic masterpiece.[30] The representation of a fiction occurs in selecting or labeling the subject and the recording documents that independent case of representing.

Under realism, Townshend's practice of assembling "eighths" is of a piece with Eisenstein's brilliant montage technique in *The Battleship Potemkin*, or the interaction of humans and dinosaurs in *Jurassic Park*. The cinematic artistry consists in juxtaposing and blending photographs of dramatic representations, not in representing.[31] The recording artistry similarly consists in assembling recordings of what is already music, but the realist sees musical artistry as something else altogether.

One way to see that recording is rock's primary medium is to show that recordings — not simply the performances that are recorded — are genuine *representations* in the ordinary sense of that term.

Realism Rejected

> Other times I'll go into the studio and play riffs with other people and then later on listen to the tapes and see what that wants to be. — Bob Dylan on composing[32]

> Nothing I've ever done with a tape recorder is brilliant . . . if you think of what the true function of what a tape recorder is — if you think of it as an automatic musical collage device. — Brian Eno[33]

The hit recordings of "Good Vibrations," "Good Times," or "Rapper's Delight" feature three distinct songs. However, *songs* are never the causal source of sound recording. Performances are. But sometimes the originating performances are of indeterminate identity when recorded. As such, the recording's identity — as featuring a specific song — cannot be settled by appeal to the identity of the independent "subject" which has been recorded. Scruton's "recording" relationship does not hold.

In the simplest cases, the identity of the originating sounds *differs* from the identity of the musical work featured on the finished recording. Elvis Costello composed the song "Beyond Belief" (1982) by adding his vocal to instrumental tracks previously recorded with the Attractions for a different song, "The Land of Give and Take." Placing a new melody and lyric over the existing track, Costello changed the identity of those instrumental tracks. On *PsychoDerelict* (1993), Pete Townshend used tracks that had been recorded for other purposes some twenty years earlier! The music's identity was not fixed until the final stages in the record-making process. Thus the performances may be "of" that work rather than another only *retrospectively*.[34]

A song is paradigmatically a specified combination of text, melody, and harmonic support.[35] A song is not composed until these elements are stipulated as combined in a manner normative for identifying subsequent instantiations. In prevailing parlance, a *type* must be specified (in the same sense that the dime in my pocket and the one in your pocket, or two occurrences of the word "goof," are two tokens of a common type). Yet rock songs are often composed by the very process of merging the vocal track with some previously recorded music: Roxy Music's "A Song for Europe" (1973); U2's "Gloria" (1981); Paul Simon's "El Condor Pasa" and "Cecilia" (1969) and "Graceland" (1986); and the Talking Heads' "Once in a Lifetime" (1980). Producer Glyn Johns complains that many of the Rolling Stones' most celebrated recordings were a bore to record, simply because Keith Richards liked to record take after take, "playing the groove . . . without any sort of top line at all."[36]

With such recordings, the identity of the featured song cannot be reduced to that of the documented performances. As distinct musical works, these songs were not fixed until the tape editing was regarded as completed.[37] Like any "serious" composition on tape, the sounds assembled as the finished work do not exemplify any one musical work (rather than another) when recorded. For any art form, we consult intention and institutional practices in order to determine what work is before us. Here, we want to know why the recording is "of" the song that it is. With rock music, the basic method for presenting a new song is through its appearance on a commercially released recording. I say more about this in the next section.

For now, I want to concentrate on the idea that the *music* performed to generate the basic tracks had an ambiguous identity at the time of its recording. World Party's Karl Wallinger employs a collage method, consciously modeled on the work practices of the Beatles and the Beach Boys. Discussing the origin of several songs on *Bang!* (1993), Wallinger explains his composing process:

> they're being written *as* they're being recorded, and they come together mainly in bits. . . . They're all recorded, really, in the same way. You could call it "the X-song." I don't iron things out, organize them, cut a demo and then do the real thing. The demo *is* the real thing.[38]

To be more precise, the "demo" (demonstration recording) becomes an element of the finished recording. For the song "Is It Like Today?" Wallinger started with a five-note melodic phrase; he and bass player Dave Catlin-Birch improvised a chord sequence against a drum machine and then recorded the rhythm guitar and bass in one take. The original five-note phrase then became the basis for Wallinger's improvised vocals, which were recorded while he listened to the backing track already laid down. This combination of melody and lyric served as the basis for subsequent revision and rerecording. Finally, keyboards, lead guitar, and backing vocals were added. The drum machine was eventually replaced with a drum track played by Wallinger. The musical work, as a distinct combination of text, melody, and harmonic support, was constructed on top of a rhythmic and harmonic schema (the generic "X-song") that could support any number of different songs. The identifiable song did not emerge until well into the process of creating the recording.

Faith No More's breakthrough album, *The Real Thing* (1989), was composed by such a process. The backing tracks were recorded by the band while they were auditioning for a new vocalist. When the other band members settled on Mike Patton for the job, they played him the completed instrumental tracks and then gave him two weeks to write lyrics and add vocal parts, turning instrumentals into songs. Similarly, two songs by Jimmy Page and Robert Plant on *No Quarter* (1994) were constructed directly on top of tape loops of North African drumming. If a different vocal line had been overdubbed onto any of these backing tracks, those tracks would feature (retrospectively) some other musical work than they do. The musicians were making music at various times in the recording process, but their music making did not count as performance of any specific work at that time.

Brian Eno exemplifies the rock tradition of constructing backing tracks with no particular plans for their later use. Pulling a track from his collection of tapes, he overdubs melodic and rhythmic material to "finish" the composition. A notable example is the basic backing track of "Sky Saw," on *Another Green World* (1975). It also became "Patrolling Wire Borders" on *Music for Films* (1978) and yet a third piece

which Eno produced for the British band Ultravox in 1977. "Listen to all three," advises Eno, "and you hear what kind of range of different usage is possible."[39] When Eno constructed the basic track, its identity was fundamentally ambiguous. It was unfinished, open ended, and could become one work or it could be another. The fact that the same sounds led to three distinct musical works demonstrates that, prior to completion, the recorded sounds had no fixed identity.

Producing U2's *Achtung Baby* (1991), Eno was one of a team of seven who assembled the finished album from various "strata." The individual songs emerged when the musicians, producers, and engineers reached consensus on how to assemble the recorded sounds into something worth regarding as a new song. Bits of recorded music-making were mixed and matched, spliced and altered, deleted and revived. On *My Life in the Bush of Ghosts* (1981), assembled with David Byrne as a combination of backing tracks and "found" vocals, one of the finished tracks was originally created for a recorded sermon by radio evangelist Kathryn Kuhlman. When her estate would not allow the use of her voice for the project, Eno and Byrne were forced to rework the tracks, thus ending up with quite a different composition. Acting as a producer for the Talking Heads, Eno encouraged the group to improvise rhythms collectively in the studio; these sessions were taped, and then songs were composed over the top of the rhythm tracks. They became *Remain in Light* (1980). Dissatisfied with the resulting songs, Eno reports that had *he* been given "carte blanche to write whatever I wanted, song-wise, over the top," the results would have been radically different.[40] Working with David Bowie on *Low* (1977), Eno took a rejected track of the two of them playing a melody together on piano and added further parts; when Bowie heard the results, they continued adding parts until the finished piece emerged.

New works are often composed by combining recordings that originated separately. Rock musicians have created a number of extended compositions through assemblage on tape, among them Neil Young's *Arc* (1993), Frank Zappa's *Lumpy Gravy* (completed in 1967), and the suites on the Grateful Dead's *Anthem of the Sun* (1968). The long instrumental coda of Derek and the Dominos's "Layla" (1972) was added after the body of the song was composed and recorded. The edit is subtle and blends two independently written segments of music, yet "Layla" was only half composed before the splicing was completed. Clapton's live performance of it on *Unplugged* (1992) omits the coda and abridges the musical work, rather like performances of Shakespeare's *Hamlet* edited to last sixty minutes.

In all these cases, much of the time the musicians were making music *without performing any specific musical work.*[41] Reworking previously recorded music, the originating performances became identified with specific works only in retrospect. As with serious electronic music, the same technology that allows "a" performance to be constructed out of several partial performances facilitates composition and stipulation of the musical work. The identity of the music on the finished recordings cannot be reduced to the identity of the music when it was being performed; performances may cause all of the sounds heard upon playing the recordings without settling the identity of the musical work. Songs are present, but not by virtue of the causal relationship between recording and performance posited in the realist "recording" relationship.

Stipulating and Composing

Offered these examples, it is tempting to conclude that some rock recordings fit the realist analysis but others do not. But that is not my point. I'm rejecting realism for all rock. As rock gradually came to use recording technologies to compose, disseminate, and represent musical thought, recordings became the primary medium for the rock tradition.

Let us consider an arbitrary example, say Booker T. and the MGs' hit recording of "Hip Hug-Her" (1967).[42] As a soul instrumental, it is autonomous in the sense of being free of any extramusical subject matter. We can concentrate on the relationships between the recording, the composition, and the originating performance(s).

As far as I know, "Hip Hug-Her" mechanically copies a single studio performance, without editing or splicing or overdubbing. If so, my compact disc mechanically replicates a performance that occurred thirty years ago. It seems to exemplify realism, featuring "Hip Hug-Her" because the originating performance was already an instance of that piece of music. But maybe not. Stax/Volt got a four-track machine in 1967. Trying it out, perhaps Booker T. Jones took a previously recorded rhythm track and overdubbed a new keyboard part, and Steve Cropper added guitar the next day. Even here, with "Hip Hug-Her" assembled from several performances, there is no problem for the realist as long as each musician intended to play that musical work on each occasion.

But it may have been more like Elvis Costello and "Beyond Belief." Suppose they recorded the bass and drum parts with quite a different work in mind, only to have Cropper later use that track as the inspiration for a new guitar part. Perhaps Jones added the keyboard part *last*

(it is the most distinctive component). The other three musicians may have been recording parts for some *other* musical work, which Jones then used to generate the composition known as "Hip Hug-Her." If so, isn't the musical work *independently represented* by the recording, apart from any causal relationship to the actual performances which exemplify that work at the time of performance?

Robert Johnson's recording of "Terraplane Blues" stands in a causal relationship to a specific performance of that song on November 23, 1936. In 1936, engineering was pretty much microphone placement and selection of the best take. Yet even if "Hip Hug-Her" was similarly derived from a single performance, many other recordings from the time were not, *including recordings by those same musicians.* In 1967, recording on tape allowed alteration along both the horizontal and the vertical axis of sound. On the horizontal, one moment of sound could be followed by another that did not follow it in real time; on the vertical, any sound might be overdubbed with another that was recorded at a different time. The engineers at Stax/Volt were learning these techniques: some of the spirited interplay between Otis Redding and Carla Thomas on *King and Queen* was edited together from various takes. Redding's untimely death spurred the process at Stax as Cropper and others worked on the demo tapes left behind. Redding's vocals were given new backings.

Furthermore, these musicians had little or no expectation of notational specification for their music. The musicians at Stax often produced cover versions of songs by learning them from commercial releases. So did Otis Redding when he covered "My Girl" and "Satisfaction." In turn, their own compositions were made known through recordings. And rather obviously so, since that one recording is the basis for all subsequent performances counting as being of "Hip Hug-Her." Once it was released and became a hit, bar bands across the country were playing the piece, having learned it from the record. (It is even possible that the musical work was never really performed until after the record was released.)

So why does my recording count as an instance of "Hip Hug-Her"? (Why does a serious composer's composition for tape instantiate one work rather than another?) Intention, rooted in musical and cultural practice, is decisive. Let us return to Cameron's photograph of King Arthur, where the subject is fictional and nonphysical. King Arthur does not cause it to be a photo of King Arthur. Realism proposes that when Cameron's subject posed, he conformed to existing conventions governing the representation of King Arthur. So she could rely on a

familiar type. Films draw on our conventions of theatrical representation. While this does not directly furnish an account of the way recordings generate new musical works via the recording process, it does direct us to the fact that the identity of a representational work always hinges on prevailing artistic conventions. In particular, it hinges on the ways in which artists *announce* and *stipulate* new works, for its status as a distinct work cannot be separated from the process by which it reaches and is recognized by its audience.[43] This includes the ways technology gets used.

We must look to the larger context of music making to determine which traditions embrace the subject/reproduction relationship posited by realism, and which do not. But the fact that rock musicians have embraced them has implications for "Hip Hug-Her" even if that particular track documents a specific performance without alteration. Given the ways that recording technology is used by rock musicians, *any* rock recording requires something more than a causal relationship to performances to establish the identity of the music "performed." Other musical traditions, including jazz and classical music, have remained conservative in their use of the same technologies. Producers will "punch in" passages on the music's horizontal axis, but there is little manipulation on the vertical axis.

Rock has long deployed an institutional framework in which new musical works are to be stipulated and disseminated by a process of recording, labeling, and releasing them. As with "Layla," *Lumpy Gravy,* or U2's "Gloria," the first instantiation accepted as such—recorded and disseminated as such—normally fixes the musical work. Indeed, plagiarism suits sometimes hinge on the question of whether the defendant had access to certain recordings of it. While commercial release is not the only way to stipulate compositions in rock, it is certainly the most common. So whichever way "Hip Hug-Her" came about, the recording should not be viewed under the realist interpretation. Even if a specific performance caused all the sounds on the recording, that fact still does not make it count as a secondary instance.

These two uses of recording technology, to compose and to announce new works, are found in every subgenre of rock. It is standard practice in rap, as when a producer constructs an instrumental backing from short fragments of sound sampled from existing recordings, then gives the backing track to someone else, who composes and adds the vocal track. Here, an additional layer of thought is generated by the practice of musical relocation. But even the predigital, presampling age

provides many cases of instrumental tracks that were fully complete before anyone wrote a melody or lyrics.

I have said that recordings can have musical works as their subject, as do performances. I concede that this sounds odd. The musical work is certainly not the subject in the way that Gertrude Stein is the subject of a photograph taken of her, nor even in the way that Picasso's painting of Stein has her as its represented subject. The Booker T. and the MGs recording instantiates "Hip Hug-Her" by *representing a performance* of it. The recording creates a "virtual" space and time in which a performance is represented as taking place.[44] Thus, just as performances of a musical work can be a standard way to announce a new (non-notated) composition, rock recordings can "impregnate" the heard sounds with the musician's and composer's thoughts by presenting a "virtual" performance.

So whatever the origins of the sounds on the recording, it provides the primary instance of the musical work "Hip Hug-Her." Subsequent performances instantiate that musical work because of a rule-governed intention to do so. Even where there are performances of specific musical works, already written and arranged when brought to the studio, there did not have to be. Neither a causal relationship nor a recording of an independent representation (the "King Arthur" scenario) is required to explain how rock recordings instantiate the works that they do. Realism may prevail for classical, jazz, folk, country, and other musics where fidelity to performance is still the goal. Under the conventions of rock the realist relationship between musical work, performances, and recording is moot; in part, thanks to rock's ongoing exploitation of the recording process itself.

Rehearing Recorded Music

> That leads to the whole question of what you are aiming to produce when you make a record. . . . one argument that is frequently leveled at me is: "You're not being very honest." I say, to hell with that. We have a different art form here.
> —Beatles producer George Martin[45]

Realists see recordings as mirrors. Like mirrors, they involve a unique, objective relation between an image and its subject. But where mirrors reflect the present, recordings freeze their subject for posterity. Freed from time's winged chariot, the image alters the viewer's relationship to the subject. Returning to a mirror we see something new (ourselves

older). Looking at a photo or listening to a recording, we encounter the past. Recordings encourage a relationship to music that seldom occurred before the invention of the phonograph.

Those who take live performance as the paradigm of musical presentation are often suspicious of this new relationship. For composer Roger Sessions, a recording holds our interest "just as long as it remains to a degree unfamiliar":

> It ceases to have interest for us, however, the instant we become aware of the fact of literal repetition, of mechanical reproduction, when we know and can anticipate exactly how a given phrase is going to be modelled, exactly how long a given fermata is to be held, exactly what quality of accent or articulation, of acceleration or retard, will occur at a given moment. When the music ceases to be fresh for us in this sense, it ceases to be alive, and we can say in the most real sense that it ceases to be music.[46]

What Sessions offers as a universal truth is the attitude of a composer who distinguishes between a composition and each of its live performances. It comes down to the proposal that once we cease to be surprised by nuances of tempo and dynamics, the sounds no longer embody music.

Sessions assumes that one is listening to a work that one already knows; hearing an unfamiliar work, one can have limited anticipation of the qualities mentioned. Like Eduard Hanslick, Sessions regards music's expressive qualities as largely due to those differences. He fastens onto precisely those qualities which cannot be specified in the score and which vary in performance. They are more a function of the performing than the work performed, so the interpretative artistry is that of the performer rather than the composer.

This largely ignores the importance of performing personae as a construct in mass culture and the degree that our response is shaped by a familiarity with the artists involved. Much of the pleasure of a new Clint Eastwood film derives from having seen him in other films; much of our pleasure in a new release by a favorite singer is in its relationship to the established personae of the performer. Even failed works, like David Byrne's *Rei Momo* (1989), Bob Dylan's *Dylan* (1973), Joe Strummer's *Earthquake Weather* (1989), or Arrested Development's *Zingalamaduni* (1994) demand our attention because of the performer's previous work, in a way that a bad Poco or Vanilla Ice album cannot. Not that we'd ever want to memorize the Rolling Stones' *Emotional Rescue* (1980). But we do listen to failures in light of other

records, in relation to a personality constructed in that medium over time, less than in light of live performances.

More importantly, when recording is the primary medium, the audience no longer listens for such variance. Imagine Sessions' remark about recorded music paraphrased as a critical comment about a movie or a short story. Through recording, music approaches the status of literature: we may read and reread a story or poem to the point of memorization, and yet take pleasure in it all the more. With recorded music, we know that each playing will be the same. We do make allowances for minor variations due to material factors (e.g., changing the settings on our equipment or buying new speakers). Interpretive variation only arises when different artists record the same song, or when the same artist rerecords it, as on a live release. No longer attuned to the question of how long the guitar will hold a note, we are free to savor and anticipate qualities and details that are simply too ephemeral to be relevant in live performance. When records are the medium, every aspect is available for our discrimination and thus for its interpretative potential.

Consider John Fogerty's reaction to Duane Eddy's first record, "Movin' and Groovin'" (1958). Fogerty recalls that the first time he heard it on the radio, "the big sound got me more than the lick or the tune." Rather than the specifically musical values as we normally understand them, Fogerty's first impression was that there was "some sort of an extra edge to the sound of that record."[47] From a realist perspective, Fogerty wasn't responding to the music at all; as he later learned, he was responding to the tape saturation in the mastering of the recording itself. It is clear that Fogerty, one year before he formed the band that would become Creedence Clearwater Revival, responded to the record itself, and not to the record as a transparent medium for getting at the music. When Fogerty was in the studio mastering *Green River* (1969) at RCA studios, RCA was in the process of converting many of Elvis Presley's older recordings to simulated stereo. Observing the process, Fogerty was outraged at the loss of the slapback echo artificially achieved by Sam Phillips on the recording.[48] Again, an important element of the musical experience is specific to the recording, not what's recorded. Like every other aspiring rock musician, Fogerty studied his favorite recordings and "memorized every note." In doing so, the "edge" and "size" of the sound were absorbed along with the notes played.

According to realism, this opportunity to focus on any and every detail of a record, including tape saturation or echo, is a flaw rather

than a virtue. Scruton argues that representation is characterized by the artist's control of the details of the representation, whereas mechanical recording introduces details beyond anyone's control. If they are not there because of artistic intention, the audience is subjected to irrelevant sounds. On Elvis Presley's "Blue Moon" (1954), we can hear a soda machine in the background; on the Beach Boys' "Wendy" (1964), someone coughs during the instrumental segment; on Bruce Springsteen's "New York City Serenade" (1973), the piano pedals squeak; on Bob Dylan's "Wedding Song" (1974), the buttons on his coat sleeve clatter against his acoustic guitar. Run-D.M.C. may have been the first to sample records that carried the unmistakable sound of damaged vinyl, with "Peter Piper" (1986); audible clicks and pops were soon in vogue on rap releases.

There is an important ambiguity in Scruton's complaint. The particular details were not beyond control. Those in charge of the recording process can monkey with the recording, or try again and release a different take. Engineer Bob Fraboni noticed the sound of the buttons and asked Dylan to take off his coat and do the song again, but Dylan declined. All music is heard in a context in which there will be *some* aesthetically irrelevant details (if not these, then some others). While Run-D.M.C. did not place each individual popping sound, they chose to feature the sounds. It is only within the context of knowing music by way of recordings that we can even point to such details as the squeak of the piano pedal or the clicking buttons and ask about their presence. It would be absurd to complain of these things in live performance, and for someone who regards fidelity to performance as the recording ideal, it is odd to claim that their presence on a recording is a flaw. Some of Van Gogh's paintings are full of cracks, a detail he did not control; is he any less a representational artist for the presence of such factors? Much as time alters the details of a painting, and yet painters control what they can in the choice of paints and their placement on the canvas, leaving any number of details to chance and the painting's aging process, the recording artist controls some factors, chooses among best takes, splices and edits, and leaves it to the listeners to note what details they will.

To the extent that details can be controlled, Scruton frets that the artist "become[s] a painter." The ideal appropriate to the materials is abandoned. Genuine representation can occur in this manner, rather than mere recording, but only by accepting a framework of "largely unnecessary constraints."[49] But this is less a criticism than a backhanded compliment. Surely Scruton is reduced to quibbling over a

difference of degree, not a difference in kind. A Picasso etching is a representational work, but one cannot think that every detail of every line in a Picasso print is there by conscious decision. And with modern recording technology, recording artists have as much control over the resulting sound as a visual artist over a print or a painting. There is not much weight to Scruton's position when George Martin can take two separate tracks, recorded in different keys and at different tempos, and slow one down and speed the other up, then edit them together to get the Beatles' recording of "Strawberry Fields Forever" (1967). The American mix emphasizes the artificiality of the edit, as Martin brings the orchestral version across the stereo plane. It is largely a matter of knowing which details were under the artists' control.

George Martin never became "a painter" producing a representation in quite the way Scruton has it. That had to wait for digital sampling. And however much the details of their recorded sound were manipulated, filtered, edited, and altered, Martin alone does not deserve credit for the recordings of the Beatles. Theirs was a collaborative achievement, crafting detailed representations of musical performances. The resulting recordings are less like a painting from the hand of Van Gogh or Jackson Pollock than one from a Renaissance workshop where masters and assistants are responsible for different parts of a complex work. Yet like those painters who find expression more readily in a palette of colors than in an etched line, many rock musicians find as much expression in the qualities of sounds themselves as in musical structures.

Memory and Tone Color

> Mechanical reproduction of art changes the reaction of the masses toward art. —Walter Benjamin[50]

Understanding music—listening to it, not simply hearing it—always requires a social dimension of learned knowledge of the music's basic parameters and conventions. Attention to form, as the organizing element of the heard sounds, is central to understanding most Western art music. However, apprehension of formal composition is hardly the primary attraction when listening and relistening to most rock music. Most of the rock audience shuns compositional complexity, either horizontally or vertically. In terms of traditional (syntactical) musical analysis, most rock music is simple and repetitive and predictable.

While there is nothing wrong with being more like a painter than

a traditional composer, I have danced around the proposal that we should be bored by sustained attention when rehearing recordings of such repetitive, predictable music. What's left to discover during the hundredth listening to the Kingsmen's "Louie Louie" (1963) or the Ramones' "I Wanna Sniff Some Glue" (1976)? Leonard B. Meyer, in a passage closely paraphrasing Hanslick's diatribe against passive or "pathological" listening, draws the typical conclusion: "rehearing may often be tolerated precisely because *listening* is not taking place—even though physiological responses are recorded and 'something' is felt introspectively." The music is "a fortuitous stimulus to pleasurable daydreams."[51]

Yet "I Wanna Sniff Some Glue" and "Louie Louie" pull me in when I *listen* attentively. And, as a member of the rock audience, I do not think that I am the oddball. (While I may wonder how Jane's Addiction can hold anyone's attention on rehearing after rehearing, I do not doubt that they do.) Yet it seems unlikely that the drama of the unfolding form and suspense about its articulation in performance is crucial. This is particularly true once we note how often rock fans listen again and again to the same records; I know a student who literally wore out a new Neil Young cassette in a month. These two features of our behavior, the enjoyment of very simple pieces of music and the tendency to listen to them over and over, have been a problem for theorists from Eduard Hanslick to Leonard Meyer.

What is needed is a plausible account of how "Louie Louie" can retain its impact when the record is played over and over. The answer must be that song structure is often an incidental framing device for something further; a "coathanger," as John Shepherd puts it, upon which other qualities and "significant personal statements" are hung.[52] Alan Durant proposes that recording shapes listening by locating the corresponding pleasure in "precise recollection and anticipation: knowing sounds, movements, and instrumental textures by memory and familiarity, rather than by extrapolation from perceived patterns, symmetries and learned musical structures."[53] But *why* should this anticipation please us? It is precisely what infuriates Sessions. Yet they suppose we *can* have a precise recollection of recorded music after we have heard it often enough. They rely on the dubious assumption that memory operates as a storage system from which items can be retrieved intact. I do not deny that we memorize many details of particular recordings, nor that these recollections supplement "extrapolation" from perceived structure. But there is overwhelming evidence that those

memories are not preserved intact. Our memories always leave it "to a degree unfamiliar."

In *The Power of Sound* (1880), Edmund Gurney anticipates these points. I do not mean his actual conclusions; he regards music's "colour" as a dispensable "secondary quality of phenomena."[54] Gurney holds that timbre cannot be important, for it cannot belong to a musical work (a composition's melodic and harmonic combinations). If he thus adopts the prevailing ideology, including its ontology, at least he sees the need to defend it. Simplified, Gurney argues that the work must be equated with a structure because that is all that we can remember with accuracy. Timbre is "reproducible in memory with the very minimum of realization of any actual sound-quality."[55] Thus timbre must not be relevant to works except in performance, and then only to facilitate our grasp of musical structure.

Shepherd, among others, emphasizes and critiques the view's lingering effects on contemporary thinking about music.[56] While he has important things to say about the way different vocal timbres communicate and reinforce traditional gender distinctions, Shepherd's account only covers the significance of *kinds* of tone color. (And even there, only for voices.) In the face of *specific* timbres of specific recordings, he falls back on the vague idea that variety keeps the audience "interested." Aesthetic properties are reduced to a sort of packaging for the social meanings. Furthermore, he locates them with performances. Again, it seems we shouldn't care about their specificity once we memorize a recording.

Enter Gurney's proposal about memory. Now, on one level he is mistaken. We can certainly remember the basic differences between the timbre of a saxophone and trumpet, or identify the voice of a favorite singer, and we can summon them at will into "the mind's ear." Furthermore, we can recall which of these qualities was featured in specific recordings, much as we can recall the color of a car we used to own. Perhaps practice in the rehearing of recorded music makes us more prone to remember timbres than was customary in Gurney's day.

On another level, Gurney suggests something that was not documented until very recently: auditory memories seem to be restricted to *species* of timbre. We can *hear* minute differences between similar timbres while listening, but these nuances begin to be forgotten about a second after the sounds cease. It just seems to be a brute fact that human perception and memory of timbre are parallel to those for both musical pitch and visual color.[57] As with memories of pitch and color,

memories of timbres "fade" after a moment, becoming more imprecise with the passage of time.

I mean, of course, in cases where a timbre is heard and retained in memory as an image heard "in the mind's ear." As such, it is a specifically *auditory* memory. Such memories differ from—and are more specific than—our ability to call up the generic clues for a certain sound (e.g., allowing one to say that a sound is from an acoustic guitar and not a piano). Auditory memories differ in kind from memories that involve an internal motor encoding, as is typical with melodies. And to the extent that a memory of musical timbre might depend on an unconscious linguistic encoding, our memories would again be limited, for they could be no more precise than a verbal description. Just try to give a precise verbal description of Morrissey's voice or the timbral shifts during Hendrix's Woodstock performance of "The Star-Spangled Banner."

The expert consensus on auditory memory dubs memory of timbre "a modest human ability, once it is separated from semantic connotations."[58] When we have a persisting mental image "recording" a timbre, the specifics of the auditory memory of timbre are not retained over time. Musical training improves the ability, but there are upper limits on it. And that is for the timbre of the human voice, where we expect the upper bounds of success. Even for vocal timbre, we seem to remember and reidentify idiosyncratic features rather than true storage of the timbre itself. When timbre is the basis for expressive qualities of a work—and it seems very important for recorded rock—it will have an expressive impact in direct experience that will be absent in our memories of it. Hence listening to it will be important in a way that remembering it is not.

In my mind's ear I recall "Louie Louie" as having a thin-sounding, metallic guitar solo. But cognitive psychology predicts that I cannot recall the *precise* timbre of that solo. Presented with brief samples of several metallic guitar tones separated from other clues about the source, I will be unreliable in identifying the "Louie Louie" timbre. I am likely to confuse it with that of Steve Cropper's guitar on "Green Onions" (1962), which is very similar. Our memories are simply not fine-tuned enough to "store" and recall the sensuous quality of the "Louie Louie" timbre, even though it can be distinguished from the "Green Onions" timbre when the two are heard one right after the other.

The relative crudity of our schemata for identifying perceptual qualities also explains the fact that we can identify a species of timbre with considerable accuracy even when it is reproduced with poor fidelity. While pitch identification is normally based on the fundamental harmonic in a sound, our schemata for pitch are flexible enough to identify pitch even when these harmonics are absent, as with the tinny reproduction of low notes on cheap speakers. There are also nuances of pitch that we can distinguish only when we actually hear them: a range of perceptually distinguishable tones are nonetheless grouped together and remembered simply as middle C or some other basic category. (In controlled experiments, even trained musicians tend to identify a very flat middle C as "in tune" when it is heard apart from a melody, and cannot distinguish between equal-temperament and perfect intervals of isolated instruments.)

The inherent imprecision of our schemata for identifying precise perceptual qualities carries over to the storing of timbre in memory. Our memories of the pitch or timbre of specific sounds cannot be more fine-grained than our schemata. Hence, we have a limited recollection of musical nuance. More significantly, no matter how well we know the structure of a musical work or recorded performance, the local qualities always promise "the thrill of the unexpected: you never know exactly what you will hear."[59] You do not know, because you do not remember them with precision. Their precise quality is only known perceptually, while perceiving them. If Sessions is not surprised by nuances of accent and timbre, perhaps he, like Gurney, simply regards them as irrelevant details and abstracts from them when listening.

Where the tone color of a recorded guitar contributes to the expressive character of the music, one can *only* experience the contribution of that tone by actually *hearing* it again in its total musical context. What has just been said about specific instrumental timbres extends to all sound quality on recordings, as well as to *overall* sound qualities emerging from decisions made in engineering and production. If "Sister Ray" is magnificent for the crudeness of its sound, its crummy sound makes its impact in the aural experience but never fully in the memory of it. Rock is a music of very specific sound qualities and their textural combination. *Specific* sounds are as central to the music as are specific colors in painting.

Sound and (Artistic) Vision

Can't you hear the sound of that record, can't you hear that?
—Phil Spector on "Da Doo Ron Ron"[60]

The dry, lightly echoed sound gives the record tremendous bite.
—Jon Landau on *Between the Buttons*[61]

We wrote sounds. We thought a lot about sounds.
—Booker T. Jones[62]

So far, I have been steering around roadblocks to treating recording as a true medium. Yet I do not want to endorse John Mowitt's claim that recording assigns a radical priority to "the moment of reception in cultural experience."[63] Drawing on the gap between "sound" and its recorded "reproduction," Mowitt speculates about the social significance of the digital bit (used for compact disc encoding) in transforming the structure of listening. Mowitt predicts that digital recordings will lead to a new experience of listening, deflating the privileges of "agency" at the point of production and dethroning authorship.

However, the audience has no access to "the peculiar logic of the bit." There is no *experiential* confirmation of its operation. Despite his emphasis on music's cultural context, Mowitt is too eager to place social significance in the technologies themselves. But I have argued that recording technologies do not fully determine the relationship between recordings, the "original" sounds, and their reception. These relationships also depend on patterns of use, including choices made by musicians among the many options provided by recording technologies. So I now turn to the musicians. Long before music's digital reproduction, rock musicians were using the studio as an instrument, emphasizing both specific timbres and the overall recorded sound, creating autographic works that cut across traditional categories of original and reproduction.

The Beach Boys are sometimes dismissed as "pop" or as a nostalgia trip, yet their initial popular success coincided with critical hosannas. There may be little reason to pay attention to anything they've done since the early 1970s, but they were among the first to employ the recording studio as an instrument in itself. Describing their time in the sun, leader Brian Wilson remembers: "I was unable to really think as a producer up until the time where I really got familiar with Phil Spector's work. . . . It's good to take a song and work with it. But it's the record that counts. It's the overall sound, what they're going to hear and experience in two and a half minutes that counts."[64] In retrospect, Wilson's songs may be less impressive than his ability to sculpt recorded sound. His songs are so closely wedded to specific voices and sounds that they have seldom worked as vehicles for other groups or singers.

Reflecting on the complex overdubbing and mixing for "Good Vibrations," Wilson said "It had a lot of movements . . . Building harmonies here, drop this voice out, this comes in, bring the echo chamber in, do this, put the Theremin there, bring the cello up a little louder here . . . I mean, it was a real production."[65] While Wilson arranged early songs in his head, the commercial release of outtakes on compact discs reveals that "Good Vibrations" was very much a process of trial and error. Going for the "overall sound," he worked with the actual sounds. Because the group's success was closely wedded to Brian Wilson's musical imagination and sense of detail, his absences due to psychosis and drugs have often led the rest of the group to simulate themselves by recycling familiar harmonies on new recordings while sticking to the old hits in concert.

If the Beach Boys are known for their distinctive arrangements and textures, other rock musicians are primarily recognized for their songwriting. Too often, this means their lyrics. Reviews of Sting and Lou Reed read more like literary than musical criticism, with nary a mention of the music. Reading enthusiastic raves about groups I've not yet heard, I generally have no clue to what the music actually sounds like.

Yet when rock musicians discuss their work, we find that their creative process centers around aural rather than textual values. Sinéad O'Connor has a confrontational, nonconformist image that leads interviewers to discuss her personal life, lyrics, and politics. When we do get a glimpse of her thoughts on *composing,* her own focus is strikingly aural:

> Texture is probably the most important aspect of my songwriting. I'm trying to achieve texture. . . . I know other writers think of it the same way. The way that you see music and songs is in shapes and textures and colors. You don't see them in terms of the words or the music. You see the shape of it, the texture of it, the color of it. The guitar with the keyboard, the notes each one plays, goes to weave the fabric.[66]

Not surprisingly, when O'Connor's next album concentrated on cover versions of songs she'd grown up singing, arranged by someone else, *Am I Not Your Girl?* (1992) proved both an aesthetic and commercial failure.

Bob Dylan, probably the most celebrated lyricist in rock, is often denigrated for both his voice and his musicianship. Yet many fans are attracted to *precisely* these qualities. Dylan is aware of this, saying, "When I do whatever it is I'm doing, . . . It's not in the lyrics."[67] John Lennon once said about Dylan:

> [Dylan] used to come with his acetate and say, "Listen to this, John, and did you hear the words?" I said that doesn't matter, the sound is what counts—the overall thing. . . . You don't have to hear what Bob Dylan's saying, you just have to hear the way he says it.[68]

Two things strike me as significant in this anecdote. The first is that by the time Dylan knew the Beatles, he was no longer introducing new songs by picking up his guitar and performing them. He was playing an acetate of studio work. Lennon's focus seems to have rubbed off on Dylan; in his notes for *Biograph* (1985), Dylan explains why some of his best songs were never released, with a laconic "a lot of stuff I've left off my records I just haven't felt has been good enough. Or maybe it didn't sound like a *record* to me."

The second point, that the singing was more important than the words sung, was reiterated by Jon Landau. Reviewing "All Along the Watchtower" on *John Wesley Harding* (1968), Landau notes that a particular line "is a great line to sing in the tone of voice Dylan uses, not the other way around. . . . I think it more natural to respond first to the music and then to the words when one is listening to a song, and I think that is in fact what most people do."[69] The commercial release of such outtakes as "Jet Pilot," "Santa Fe," and "Someone's Got a Hold of My Heart" aurally demonstrate that Dylan often works out the music before the lyrics. (In live performance, Dylan frequently reverses the process, overhauling the melodies of his most famous songs in order to take advantage of the musicians with him onstage.)

David Byrne makes similar points about his early attraction to rock:

> When I grew up and first started hearing rock music, pop, and soul, it was the *sound* that really struck me. The words were, for the most part, pretty stupid. But it was the sound, the texture of the guitar and drums, the way one song sounded so completely different than another. The texture a group of musicians arrives at, in support of melody or lyrics, can be at least as important as the melody line or lyrics or whatever. It can make a statement that supports or contradicts it.[70]

In another interview, he emphasizes the same point in accounting for the sound of the early Talking Heads: "A lot of pop music with its guitar and drum solos seemed to be superfluous to the idea of what the music was about. So why not strip it down and deal with the idea, which often seemed to be textural rather than narrative? A lot of pop music communicated by texture rather than what the words were saying."[71]

Empirical studies suggest that Byrne's reaction is typical of the rock audience. In one study, fewer than a third of rock listeners could provide plausible interpretations of current hits, and more than a third of the time teens could not explain the lyrics to one of their three favorite songs. Decades of research on the effects of rock lyrics on the audience support one position: "lyrics are not the primary reason that the young have for listening to popular music but rather the musical beat or overall *sound* of a recording is of greater interest to teenagers."[72] Metaphors and allusions are largely lost on the teen audience, including those of "Stairway to Heaven," a staple of FM radio and certainly one of *the* best-known rock songs.

If many listeners have no clue about the meaning of the lyrics to "Stairway to Heaven," their focus on the overall sound may be closer to Led Zeppelin's intent than is usually allowed. To be blunt, in rock music most lyrics don't matter very much. Or, to be more precise, they are of limited interest on the printed page, divorced from the music. We emphasize the wrong thing if we think that profound lyrics are in any way superior to "Wop Bop A Loo Bop" as something to sing. Except for the highly atypical arrangement between Elton John and lyricist Bernie Taupin, the lyrics usually arise late in the composing process of rock music. Typical of their creative process, the Rolling Stones collectively recorded the music that became *Exile on Main Street* (1972) under the title *Tropical Disease;* only then did Jagger write the bulk of the lyrics and complete the vocal tracks, at which point the American emphasis of the lyrics demanded a title change.

Returning to Led Zeppelin, both Robert Plant and John Paul Jones confirm that some of the group's most powerful recordings arose as vehicles for a certain recorded sound. Plant recalls that "Houses of the Holy" arose from their interest in recreating a very specific drum sound that they admired on an obscure R&B recording. Jones relates that "When the Levee Breaks" (1971), the closer for their fourth album, also arose from a very particular drum sound. Recording the album in an old mansion house, the drums were placed in a hall beside a stairwell to eliminate leakage from tracks recorded in the main room. They placed two M1160 microphones high *above* the drums rather than record them closely, then ran it through an echo unit. Jones says that the sound "wrote the song . . . that whole song just came from the drum sound."[73] The song exists because it suits that specific drum sound, rather than

the drum sound being fitted to a song independently composed. Here, structure seems the servant of a nuance of timbre and not the other way around.

In a sense, then, Scruton is right. Employing recording as their primary medium, rock musicians have become painterly. But not neoclassical painters like Jean Ingres and Jacques-Louis David, who insisted that color is subordinate to line and drawing. They are painters in the tradition of Eugène Delacroix, for whom color is the essence of the art. In fixing specific sounds and their colors as essential properties of a musical work, recording technologies or some other "canvas" grounds the autographic musical works.

Actual practice undercuts the realist assumption that our interest in a photograph or film, and by extension a sound recording, is primarily an interest in its subject or in its mode of representation, but never both. I see no "prima facie contradiction" in being interested in both simultaneously.[74] When I look at a painting, my interest in the painting's subject does not exclude an equal interest in its artistic qualities in representing that subject. When I attend a concert and hear a performance of a musical work, I attend to both the musical work and to its interpretation in this particular performance. Likewise, when I listen to recorded music which I know to be constructed as such, I may be equally interested in both the musical work and its articulation in this recording. Just as Scruton acknowledges that an "appreciative spectator" understands that an artist introduces a "way of seeing" in the relationship between a painting and its subject matter,[75] an appreciative rock fan understands that the process of making records introduces its own "way of hearing" the music.

Coda

The most succinct demonstration of what I have been saying about sound's central role in rock music is XTC's "History of Rock 'n' Roll," from their *Rag & Bone Buffet* compilation (1990). In a mock lecture lasting twenty-two seconds, Andy Partridge summarizes four decades of rock. He simply names successive decades, illustrating each with one characteristic sound. For the fifties, an Elvis-like voice hiccups before swooping upward; the sound is heavily echoed. We are in Sun studios. The sixties are a frenetic lead guitar run filtered through a Rotovibe pedal; the sound is a bit muddy and heavily equalized, dampening the higher frequencies. It could be the solo from a Cream single. For the seventies, two fat, sustained, and reverberating power chords on a

guitar recall the sound of Mick Ronson on David Bowie's "Suffragette City" (1972). The eighties are a squeal of synthesized sound; they could be the synthesizer parts on Cyndi Lauper's *She's So Unusual* (1983). One might quibble with Partridge's choices, but surely these sounds are as central to the musical thinking of their respective decades as was the piano for Liszt or Chopin. But these sounds serve as such telling markers for their respective decades only because they appeared when they did as *recorded* music.

65 Jerrold Levinson disputes Goodman's analysis of autographic/allographic: musical works are autographic "by Goodman's yardstick," but allographic on Levinson's revised analysis. See Levinson, *Music, Art, & Metaphysics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), chapters 5 and 10, pp. 101 and 250.
66 Levinson, *Music, Art, & Metaphysics,* pp. 89–106.
67 Ibid., p. 101.
68 Ibid., p. 101.
69 Goodman, *Languages of Art,* p. 113 n.
70 As discussed in chapter 2, the jazz tradition retains an expectation that recordings will function as transparent windows on specific performances.
71 In rock music, many "live" recordings are anything but the duplication of particular performances. Crosby, Stills, Nash and Young retouched vocal tracks of their Woodstock performance. Grateful Dead fans report that "live" Dead albums sometimes falsify the originating performances; again, comparison of the albums with tapes from radio broadcasts reveal that instruments and solos are mixed out and replaced. Tapes of Bruce Springsteen's local radio broadcast from the Roxy in Los Angeles in 1978 demonstrate that at least one track on his *Live/1975–85,* "Backstreets," receives a drastic edit.
72 Goodman, *Languages of Art,* p. 119.
73 Such a tape will be a referential forgery; see Levinson, *Music, Art, & Metaphysics,* p. 103.

2 *I'll Be Your Mirror: Recording and Representing*

1 Sam Morgenstern, *Composers on Music* (New York: Pantheon, 1956), p. 513.
2 John Berger, "Appearances," in John Berger and Jean Mohr, *Another Way of Telling* (New York: Pantheon, 1982), p. 95.
3 Reebee Garofalo, "Understanding Mega-Events," in Reebee Garofalo, ed., *Rockin' the Boat: Mass Music & Mass Movements* (Boston: South End Press, 1992), p. 24.
4 Carl Belz, *The Story of Rock,* 2d ed. (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. viii, emphasis added. I disagree with Belz's thesis that rock is a form of folk art; see chapter 7.
5 James Goodfriend, quoted in *The Phonograph and Our Musical Life,* Proceedings of a Centennial Conference 7–10 December 1977, ed. H. Wiley Hitchcock (New York: Institute for Studies in American Music, 1980), p. 12.
6 See Phillip H. Ennis, *The Seventh Stream: The Emergence of Rocknroll in American Popular Music* (Hanover and London: Wesleyan University Press, 1992); Steve Chapple and Reebee Garofalo, *Rock 'n' Roll Is Here to Pay: The History and Politics of the Music Industry* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1977); and Russell Sanjek and David Sanjek, *American Popular Music Business in the 20th Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
7 Simon Frith, "Popular Music 1950–1980," *Making Music,* ed. George Martin (New York: William Morrow, 1983), p. 47. As Jacques Attali observes, "emphasis was placed on *preservation,* not mass *replication.*" Attali, *Noise: The Political Economy of Music* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), p. 91.

8 Quoted in Ivo Supicic, *Music in Society: A Guide to the Sociology of Music,* Sociology of Music, no. 4 (Stuyvesant, N.Y.: Pendragon Press, 1987), p. 186.
9 See, for instance, André Bazin, *What Is Cinema?,* vol. 1, trans. H. Gray (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), and an analysis of Bazin in Noël Carroll, *Philosophical Problems of Classical Film Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 93–171. This is not John Fiske's sense of the term, where "the essence of realism is that it reproduces reality in such a form as to make it easily understandable" (John Fiske, *Television Culture* [London and New York: Methuen, 1987], p. 24).
10 William Moylan, *The Art of Recording: The Creative Resources of Music Production and Audio* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1992), p. 81 (emphasis added).
11 Susan Sontag, *On Photography* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1978), p. 158. The same position is advanced by Stanley Cavell, *The World Viewed* (New York: Viking, 1971), pp. 23–24. Cavell, in turn, acknowledges Bazin.
12 Roger Scruton, "Photography and Representation," *The Aesthetic Understanding* (London and New York: Methuen, 1983), p. 105. See William L. King, "Scruton and Reasons for Looking at Photographs," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 23 (1992), pp. 258–65.
13 Scruton, *The Aesthetic Understanding,* p. 122.
14 Ibid., p. 118, see also pp. 119–26. Later, I take issue with his view that interest in a recording is due to interest in its subject while interest in a representation is due to interest in how it represents its subject.
15 Quoted in Jann Wenner, "Peter Townshend," in *The Rolling Stone Interviews* (New York: Paperback Library, 1971), p. 97; original interview conducted 1968.
16 Quoted in Greil Marcus, *Lipstick Traces* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 1, emphasis added; no source provided by Marcus.
17 Paul Hernadi, "Reconceiving Notation and Performance," *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 25 (1991), p. 53, emphasis deleted. See also Nicholas Wolterstorff, *Works and Worlds of Art* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 79.
18 Hernadi, pp. 54–55.
19 Lydia Goehr, *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 266–67.
20 Ibid., pp. 245–57. The ideological dimension of this issue is treated at greater length in my closing chapter.
21 Roman Ingarden, *The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity,* trans. Adam Czerniawski (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986), p. 157, emphasis added.
22 Roland Barthes, *Camera Lucida,* trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981), p. 82.
23 Ibid., pp. 104–14. Page 112 is particularly germane. See William Moylan, *The Art of Recording,* chapter 4. Moylan contends that "the recording process can capture reality" and "can be transparent in documenting a performance" (pp. 77 and 82); Moylan agrees that "the recording aesthetic is determined by the relationship of the recording to the live listening experience" (p. 88). Recordings

typically aim at fixing "perfect" or "definitive" performances "of a work," so many people have unrealistic expectations about live performance.

24 This assumption is challenged by John Tagg, *The Burden of Representation* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988).

25 Arthur Danto, *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 149–60.

26 Roland Barthes, *Writing Degree Zero,* trans. Annette Lavers and Colin Smith (New York: Hill & Wang, 1968), p. 64.

27 Aaron Copland, *Music and Imagination* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 25 and 29.

28 According to Pierre Bourdieu, one then responds with the "codes from everyday life." Pierre Bourdieu, "A Sociological Theory of Art Perception," *The Field of Cultural Production* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); see also P. Bourdieu and Alain Darbel with Dominique Schnapper, *The Love of Art: European Museums and Their Public* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), and P. Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984).

29 See Mike Weaver, *Julia Margaret Cameron: 1815–1879* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1984), p. 97; six photos are reproduced in *The Camera,* ed. Time-Life Books (New York: Time-Life, 1970), pp. 192–93.

30 Scruton, *The Aesthetic Understanding,* p. 102; see also pp. 112–13.

31 Ibid., pp. 124–25.

32 Quoted by Denise Worrell, "It's All Right in Front," *Time,* 25 November 1985, p. 123.

33 Quoted in Geoff Brown, "Eno Where It's At," *Melody Maker* 48 (10 November 1973), p. 41.

34 John Lennon criticized George Harrison for the latter's copyright problems with "My Sweet Lord," which was ruled to unknowingly plagiarize the earlier song "He's So Fine." Lennon revealed that he often wrote new songs by recording old songs, then changing the words and melody in the process sufficiently to count as a new song. The boxes of work tapes left behind after his assassination reveal that his music making would begin with a familiar song, only to become a different song by a slow transformation. Yet it was only by reference to the "new" song, at the end of the process, that the intermediate music making can be regarded as instantiations of that song rather than the one which started the process. Ironically, this is what Harrison did in plagiarizing "He's So Fine." Harrison had taken a different song and was in the process of rewriting it by trial and error when he inadvertently lapsed into copying "He's So Fine."

35 See Jerrold Levinson, "Song and Music Drama," in *What Is Music?* ed. Philip Alperson (New York: Haven, 1988), pp. 283–301.

36 Quoted in Mark Rowland, "Glyn Johns Meets Don Was," *Musician* 190 (August 1994), p. 52.

37 A stubborn Platonist who holds that composers only discover preexisting norm-kinds can interpret these cases accordingly, but the consequence is the same; tape editing replaces notational stipulation as the composition act by which the composer deserves credit for composing one work rather than another.

38 Quoted in Tony Scherman, "World Party: Greatness or Bust," *Musician* 175 (May 1993), p. 68.

39 Brian Eno, excerpted by Howard Mandel, "Pro Session: The Studio as Compositional Tool—Part II," *Down Beat* 50 (August 1983), p. 51. Similarly, Eno's "No One Receiving" and "M386" share a common instrumental track.

40 Quoted in Kurt Loder, *Bat Chain Puller* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), p. 206; Eno interviewed in 1981. For a description of the process involved in the making of *Achtung Baby,* see Brian Eno, "Bringing Up Baby," *Rolling Stone,* 28 November 1991, pp. 42–50 and 116.

41 For arguments that the presence of a musical work is not essential in musical performance, see Nicholas Wolterstorff, "The Work of Making a Work of Music," in *What Is Music?,* ed. Philip Alperson (New York: Haven, 1988), p. 118, and Paul Thom, *For an Audience: A Philosophy of the Performing Arts* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993).

42 I choose this example because it is an instrumental, so there is no complicating issue of lyrics introducing an additional subject matter.

43 I agree with T. J. Diffey that any pieces "that have not been submitted to public scrutiny are not works of art." At least not yet; they may be later, through submission for scrutiny. Works not yet submitted are essentially unfinished, if only because the artist may yet change important features, in which case a *different* work may emerge. See Diffey, *The Republic of Art and Other Essays,* New Studies in Aesthetics, vol. 6 (New York: Peter Lang, 1991), p. 41. This squares with Mikhail Bakhtin's idea that a work of art is fundamentally *addressed;* see Bakhtin, "The Problem of the Text in Linguistics, Philology and the Human Sciences," in *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays,* ed. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986).

44 See Moylan, *The Art of Recording,* chapter 4, and Allan F. Moore, *Rock: The Primary Text,* Popular Music in Britain (Buckingham and Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1993), pp. 105–110. This interpretation is at odds with that of William Webster, "A Theory of the Compositional Work of Music," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 33 (1974), pp. 59–66. Webster believes that such recordings directly instantiate musical works, whereas I believe that they do so indirectly, by representing performances.

45 George Martin, *All You Need Is Ears* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), pp. 76–77.

46 Roger Sessions, *The Musical Experience of Composer, Performer and Listener* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), p. 70. See also Roger Sessions, *Questions About Music* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970), pp. 51–52.

47 Quoted in James Hunter, "John Fogerty Meets Duane Eddy," *Musician* 157 (November 1991), p. 52.

48 Ibid., p. 59. To ensure that the sound will be right, both Fogerty and Dr. Dre test work in progress by playing tapes of different mixes in their cars. Where Fogerty uses ordinary car speakers, Dr. Dre uses a bass-heavy system.

49 Scruton, *The Aesthetic Understanding,* p. 117.

50 Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in *Illuminations,* ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1968), p. 236.

51 Leonard B. Meyer, "On Rehearing Music," *Music, the Arts, and Ideas* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 49. I deal with other versions of this accusation, by Adorno and Attali, in chapter 6.

52 See John Shepherd, *Music as Social Text* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p. 164. Originally "Music and Male Hegemony," in Richard Leppert and Susan McClary, eds., *Music and Society: The Politics of Composition, Performance and Reception* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 163.

53 Alan Durant, *Conditions of Music* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), p. 113.

54 Edmund Gurney, *The Power of Sound* (New York: Basic Books, 1966, reprint of London: 1880), p. 307. For a summary and critique of Gurney, see Malcolm Budd, *Music and the Emotions* (London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), chapter 4.

55 Gurney, *The Power of Sound*, pp. 296–97.

56 Shepherd, *Music as Social Text*, pp. 159–64.

57 See Diana Raffman, *Language, Music, and Mind* (Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, 1993), chapters 4 and 5. Raffman emphasizes the perception of ineffable nuances of pitch, timing, and speed "around the structural frame of the piece" (p. 91). She occasionally mentions nuance of timbre, but assigns it no particular communicative role. There may be individuals with unusually acute memories of musical nuance, but such individuals do not challenge my argument, since their abilities are hardly normative for the rest of us.

58 Robert G. Crowder, "Auditory Memory," in *Thinking in Sound: The Cognitive Psychology of Human Audition*, ed. S. McAdams and E. Bigand (Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 138; see pp. 134–40.

59 Raffman, *Language, Music, and Mind*, p. 96.

60 Quoted by Greil Marcus, "Who Put the Bomp in the Bomp-De-Bomp De-Bomp?" in *Rock and Roll Will Stand*, ed. Greil Marcus (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), pp. 11–12.

61 Jon Landau, *It's Too Late to Stop Now* (San Francisco: Straight Arrow Books, 1972), p. 68.

62 Quoted in Rob Bowman, booklet notes for *The Complete Stax/Volt Singles: 1959–1968* (Atlantic Recording Corporation, 1991), p. 31.

63 John Mowitt, "The Sound of Music in the Era of Its Electronic Reproducibility," in Leppert and McClary, eds., *Music and Society: The Politics of Composition, Performance and Reception*, p. 173.

64 Quoted in David Leaf's liner notes to the compact disc reissue of the Beach Boys *Today/Summer Days and Summer Nights* (Capitol, 1990).

65 Quoted in David Leaf's liner notes to the compact disc reissue of the Beach Boys, *Smiley Smile/Wild Honey* (Capitol, 1990).

66 Quoted in Bill Flanagan, "Sinéad O'Connor," *Musician* 142 (August 1990), p. 46.

67 Quoted in Paul Williams, *Performing Artist: The Music of Bob Dylan*, vol. 1, 1960–1973 (Novato, Calif. and Lancaster, Pa.: Underwood-Miller, 1990), p. 261; original source is a 1984 radio interview.

68 Quoted in Jann Wenner, *Lennon Remembers* (San Francisco: Straight Arrow Books, 1971), p. 188.

69 Jon Landau, "John Wesley Harding," in *Bob Dylan: A Retrospective*, ed. Craig McGregor (New York: William Morrow, 1972), p. 262; review originally in *Crawdaddy!* 1968.

70 Quoted in Bill Flanagan, *Written in My Soul* (Chicago and New York: Contemporary Books, 1987), p. 343.

71 Quoted in John Howell, *David Byrne* (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1992), pp. 47–48.

72 Jill Rosenbaum and Lorraine Prinsky, "Sex, Violence and Rock 'n' Roll: Youths' Perceptions of Popular Music," *Popular Music and Society* 11 (1987), p. 85, emphasis added. Further details of their research with teenagers are included in L. E. Prinsky and J. L. Rosenbaum, " 'Leer-ics' or Lyrics: Teenage Impressions of Rock 'n' Roll," *Youth & Society* 18 (1987), pp. 384–97. Their findings are consistent with those conducted two decades earlier, when two independent studies supported the conclusion that about 70 percent of listeners regard "sound" as more important than lyrics in rock music; see Graham Murdock and Guy Phelps, "Responding to Popular Music: Criteria of Classification and Choice Among English Teenagers," *Popular Music & Society* 1 (1971), pp. 146–47.

73 Robert Plant and John Paul Jones interviews on Led Zeppelin, *Remasters* (Atlantic Records, 1992), disc 3.

74 Scruton, *The Aesthetic Understanding*, p. 115.

75 Ibid., p. 107.

3 *Record Consciousness*

1 Quoted in Alan Light, "Ice-T," *Rolling Stone*, 20 August 1992, p. 30. Ice-T's given name is Tracy Marrow.

2 Quoted in David Fricke, "Waiting for the Band," *Rolling Stone*, 24 June 1993, p. 18.

3 Steve Chapple and Reebee Garofalo, *Rock 'n' Roll Is Here to Pay: The History and Politics of the Music Industry* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1977), p. 315.

4 Timothy Binkley, "Piece: Contra Aesthetics," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 35 (1970), p. 269. The Duchamp example later in this section is taken from Binkley.

5 Ibid., p. 270.

6 Ibid., p. 271.

7 My influences on this topic include Monroe C. Beardsley, *Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism*, 2d ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1981); Bernard Bosanquet, *Three Lectures on Aesthetic* (London: Macmillan, 1931), pp. 58–75; and Aaron Copland, *Music and Imagination* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952), chapter 2.

8 R. G. Collingwood, *The Principles of Art* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958); see chapter 11, particularly p. 245.